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CASE COMMENTS
upon state law enforcement to an extent generally thought to be
beyond the authority of federal courts.
T. E. P.
CnmmiNAL LAW-FELONY-MURDER-STATtORY INTERP=EATION.
-D and B committed an armed robbery upon X. As they fled from
the scene X killed B. Held, (remanding the case for a new trial),
that D can be convicted of murder under the felony-murder statute
(4-3 decision). Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 689, 117 A.2d
204 (1955).
Decisions in the United States on the felony-murder rule are
divided into four categories: (1) Some states follow the rule that,
if a killing occurs in the commission of a felony it is murder. The
states which follow this rule do not require that the felony be one
of violence. (2) A homicide committed in the perpetration of
certain dangerous felonies is ipso facto declared to be murder.
(3) A homicide committed in the commission of a felony is murder
only when the act itself is one involving extreme risk to human
life, and it is believed that the risk must be known to the actor.
(4) Apparently Ohio refuses to recognize the felony-murder doc-
trine in any form. MoRm_4zm, LAw oF HOMIC=E 48-49 (1952).
Pennsylvania would seem to be in the second category. Ac-
cording to the language of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon
1939) "All murder... which shall be committed in the perpetra-
tion of any ... robbery ... shall be murder in the first degree".
(Emphasis supplied.)
The principal case presents two problems. First, how far can
the courts go in imputing to the defendant the occurrence of death,
where such occurrence was not intended and only remotely con-
nected with the defendants scheme? Second, as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, is it necessary that the occurrence of death be
(common law) murder in order to be raised to felony-murder
(first degree), or does any killing, short of common law murder,
satisfy the statute?
In earlier cases the Pennsylvania judges had specifically
charged the juries that, if they believe that the death during com-
mission of a felony resulted from another's act, they should acquit
the defendant. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl.
97 (1936); Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 839, 144 AUt. 534
(1928). Two later cases, Commonwealth v. Moyer (Byron), 357 Pa.
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181, 53 A.2d 786 (1947), and Commonwealth v. Ameida, 862 Pa.
596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), departed from this rule and extended the
felony-murder doctrine in Pennsylvania. In both these cases the
death-causing agency (gun shots) was set in motion by parties
not in privity with the defendant, and innocent third parties lost
their lives. The defendants were found guilty of felony-murder
under the statute. The principal case extends the application of
the felony-murder doctrine even more by applying it to the death
of a principal to the felony upon which his co-principal's murder
is based.
It is difficult to rationalize the instant case on the doctrine of
causation. The court considered the death as the natural and fore-
seeable result of the initial act of robbery. To the extent that
every attack on life, liberty or property invites defense or resistance,
this is correct. However, even in applying the felony-murder rule
it would seem that the actus reus of the defendant falls short of
the usual minimum required by law. It is admitted that the de-
fendant committed an unlawful act, but even with the felony-
murder rule, as expressed by statute, it is only by doing violence to
the doctrine of causation that the defendant's act can be stretched
to constitute the commission of the crime of murder. The actus
reus of murder is killing, or an act the natural and foreseeable re-
sult of which is the jeopardy of human life. The defendant in this
case committed no such act. The felony-murder rule in itself has
become a dangerous doctrine.
The common law also requires that there be a mens rea oper-
ating in conjunction with the actus reus. In the case of murder the
mens rea is an intent to kill in the most generalized form. The
felony-murder rule dispenses with a mens rea for murder, relying
solely on the mens rea for the basic felony. This doctrine, in effect,
creates a liability without fault. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law,
58 W. VA. L. BEv. 43 (1955). "Where the state of mind which
prompted the action does not constitute the particular mens rea
required the courts have repudiated the notion that the intent to
commit another crime should be 'transferred'. This is entirely
proper; mere fiction should be discarded in favor of a careful analy-
sis of the physical element which may be combined with the actus
reus in order to constitute the offense charged". Perkins, A Rationale
of Mens Rea, 52 HAnv. L. REv. 928 (1939). The Pennsylvania
statute is inconsistent with this reasoning.
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In the subsequent case of Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa.
500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955), (reversed on other grounds), the de-
ceased, a partner in crime of the defendant, set the fire which
caused his death. The felony-murder rule was held applicable.
The case is distinguishable from the principal case however, in
that the defendant in this case satisfied at least the minimum act
required to impute the death directly to him, since he instigated
the felony and induced the deceased to commit the highly life
endangering crime of arson. Moreover, no third person's act was
responsible directly for the death. Thus, neither as to actus reus,
nor as to mens rea, does Commonwealth v. Bolish, supra, present
as dangerous a departure from common law standards as does the
instant case.
With the mentioned precedents at its command it was not
difficult for the Pennsylvania court to render the instant decision.
This case seemingly would fall within the unfortunate Pennsyl-
vania felony-murder rule, but for one aspect: the killing in the
perpetration of the felony must be murder. How could the court
ignore the words of the legislature? Penal statutes must be strictly
construed. In construing the word murder to mean any loss of
life, the court has violated one of the basic canons of statutory
construction. See Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156, 64 Atl. 419 (1906).
One of the underlying reasons that prompted the majority of
the court to decide in favor of applying the felony-murder in this
case was "the protection of society". Commonwealth v. Thomas,
supra at 207. The whole history of the penal law suggests that
the court took a step in the wrong direction. Extreme punish-
ments, and imposition of liability without fault-even partial liabil-
ity without fault-weaken rather than strengthen respect for the
law.
G. T. L.
DEEDs OF TmlusT-OBLioAT oN DuE Pmon To 1921-SxLE NOT
BAlnED BY STATUTE OF LIMIrATIoNs.-A executed a note to B, due
and payable on November 1, 1914, and conveyed Blackacre-to T,
trustee, to secure payment. B died, leaving P as distributee and heir
at law. C purchased Blackacre from A, and C and wife executed a
note to P, due November 1, 1925, allegedly including the above debt.
C died, leaving a widow and D, children and heirs at law. The
widow died in 1952, and thereafter P requested T to sell Blackacre,
3
L.: Criminal Law--Felony-Murder--Statutory Interpretation
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1956
